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Abstract
The Japanese labour market has been regarded as ‘dualistic’ in terms of
employment status (regular vs non-regular). While it is true, this perspective
misses recent changes in regular employment in terms of labour ﬂexibility.
The government has attempted labour market deregulation since the 1990s to
increase the ﬂexibility of not only non-regular but also regular employment,
and the labour market has become more diversiﬁed. Labour unions lack power
resources to resist these neoliberal changes, however, because of their insufficient
access to policy-making, low union density and a lack of solidarity against the
background of economic stagnation and competition under globalization.
1. Introduction
Against the background of economic stagnation after the collapse of the
bubble economy in the early 1990s and intensiﬁed economic competition from
neighbouring Asian countries, Japanese employers have attempted to reduce
the number of regular workers who can beneﬁt from seniority wages and
job protection under lifetime employment (Goto¯ 2011: 9–12; Nakano 2006:
61–6, 118–20). In response, the government of the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) implemented labourmarket deregulation aimed at expanding the use of
non-regular employment such as ﬁxed-term contracts and temporary agency
work (Watanabe 2012, 2014, 2015a). However, the LDP government also
deregulated regular employment in terms of working-time rules to promote
its ﬂexibility. Labour market deregulation has deteriorated the working
conditions of regular workers, not only those in small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) but also those most protected in large companies under lifetime
employment, as a result of the increased use of non-regular workers and the
changes in regular employment such as a greater use of ﬂexible working-
time rules and result-oriented performance-based pay (Imai 2011: 104–11;
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Isogai 2012: 45, 55; Mizoue 2015: 4, 20). Despite the existence of ‘dualism’
between regular and non-regular employment in terms of wages, employment
protection and so on, the Japanese labour market has becomemore diversiﬁed
as a result of the shrinking core of regular workers and the greater diversity in
regular employment.
This article examines the political process of reforming ‘regular’
employment in Japan, which has not been examined sufficiently in the
exiting English literature, especially the one based on a dualism perspective
(Emmenegger 2015; Emmenegger et al. 2012; Hassel 2014; Palier and Thelen
2010; Song 2012; Thelen 2009, 2014; Thelen and Kume 1999, 2006; Yun
2016). The article claims that, from the perspective of unions’ power resources
(Esping-Andersen 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983, 2006) and
preferences (Gordon 2015), labour unions allowed the LDP government to
attempt to reform regular employment in a way to increase its ﬂexibility,
and the working conditions of regular workers have deteriorated. It is true
that a dualization thesis can explain cross-class alliances between employers
and core regular workers in Japan’s competitive sectors that promoted
deregulation of non-regular employment. However, it does not recognize
that the conﬂicts of interest in labour market ﬂexibility between unions in
competitive and non-competitive sectors have undermined class solidarity
and reduced the power resources of unions for core regular workers as
‘insiders’ as a result of an increasing number of unorganized non-regular
workers as ‘outsiders’. While dualism still exists, this article demonstrates
that the Japanese labour market has become more ‘diversiﬁed’, rather than
simply remain dualistic, as a result of reduced power resources of unions
and more ﬂexible use of regular employment. We can now identify diverse
types of workers such as a shrinking ‘core’ of regular workers, who are
protected under lifetime employment and beneﬁt from seniority-based pay
but increasingly suffer from deteriorating working conditions; ‘professional’
or ‘specialist’ regular workers, who are supposed to have job discretion and
working-time ﬂexibility but actually work under poor working conditions
without receiving overtime pay in most situations; ‘peripheral’ regular
workers (mostly seen in SMEs but also in large companies), who have become
more vulnerable to employers’ neoliberal offensives on job protection and do
not beneﬁt from seniority-based pay despite their status as regular workers
(Kinoshita 2007: 67–70); ‘semi’-regular workers (mostly female) with limited
job responsibilities in a way to be able to strike a better work-life balance
but subject to a lower pay and easier dismissal than regular workers; and
non-regular workers, whose working conditions remain precarious.
The Japanese labour market has been characterized dualistic since long
time ago (regular workers vs non-regular workers such as rinjiko¯ (temporary
workers) and shagaiko¯ (subcontractors) in manufacturing sectors from the
1950s, part-time workers from the late 1960s and agency workers from the
mid-1980s) and the boundaries of core/periphery have changed over time
according to diversiﬁed corporate strategy, with a decreasing number of core
regular workers under lifetime employment, including internal transfer of
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regular workers from headquarters to subsidiaries in the same corporate
group, and an increasing number of non-regular workers (Goka 1999: 16–
19, 22–5; Isogai 2012: 43–5; Kawakita 1997; Yamada and Hirano 2012: 19–
20). It is true that labour market deregulation implemented by the LDP
government from the 1990s was mostly aimed at non-regular employment,
and the gap between relatively well-protected regular workers as insiders
and poorly protected non-regular workers as outsiders can be identiﬁed, as
scholars of labour market dualism have pointed out (Song 2012; Thelen and
Kume 1999, 2006; Yun 2016). These scholars (including those with a ‘varieties
of capitalism’ perspective) regard liberalization of the labourmarket in several
‘non-liberal’ market economies (such as Sweden, Germany and Japan, which
differ among themselves in terms of unions’ policy-making access, the degree
of centralization of collective bargaining, union density, the degree of labour
mobilization and so on) as a process of ‘dualization’ (Emmenegger 2015;
Emmenegger et al. 2012: 9–17; Hassel 2014; Palier and Thelen 2010; Thelen
2009, 2014). They claim that, in contrast to liberal market economies such as
the United States and Britain that deregulated both regular and non-regular
employment, non-liberal market economies responded to liberalizing pressure
mostly by promoting dualism with deregulation of non-regular employment
and continued protection of regular workers from dismissal.
However, this dualism perspective does not recognize recent changes in
regular employment in non-liberal market economies that has become more
ﬂexible as a result of governments’ relaxation of employment protection for
regular workers, such as the introduction of ﬁduciary compensation without
employers’ obligation to reinstate workers to previous work positions in
the case of unfair dismissal (Moreira et al. 2015: 206–8). In addition, the
dualism perspective does not recognize the recent government policy to
increase the protection of ‘non-regular’ workers possibly as a ‘de-dualization’
strategy (Moreira et al. 2015: 219–20). The puzzle for Japan in relation to
theories of dualization is that, although it is categorized as a non-liberal
market economy, where according to a dualism perspective the government
attempts to implement deregulation only in non-regular employment and
strong protection remains in regular employment, the government has actually
deregulated or intended to deregulate regular employment as well to cope with
a poor economic situation and promote economic growth, as in the cases
of other non-liberal market economies such as Denmark, Italy and Spain.
These cases challenge the simplistic dualism perspective by demonstrating
the government intention to deregulate regular employment in response to
employers’ demand. While the dualism perspective is useful for explaining
cross-class alliances between employers and regular workers in competitive
sectors to maintain their jobs, these regular workers’ behaviour has actually
undermined unions’ power resources by intensifying the conﬂicts of interest
between workers in competitive and non-competitive sectors and reducing
labour solidarity. These regular workers’ tacit approval of the deregulation
of non-regular employment also undermined labour’s power resources by
increasing the number of unorganized non-regular workers. As a result of the
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reduced power resources of labour, the LDP government has promoted, or
attempted to promote, the ﬂexibility of regular employment, contrary to the
dualism perspective.
This article uses data collected from unions’ policy documents, newspaper
articles (those published by twomajor Japanese newspapers ofAsahi Shimbun
and Nihon Keizai Shimbun) and the minutes of government labour advisory
councils and cabinet committees such as the Deregulation Committee and
the Industrial Competitiveness Council. In addition, more than 30 interviews
with labour unions in Tokyo and Osaka areas were conducted between 2013
and 2016. Interviewees were selected in a way to identify the opinions on
labour market deregulation among unions at national, industrial, enterprise
and local levels. Interviews were conducted with two national centres of
Rengo¯ (Japanese Trade Union Confederation, the largest national centre
in Japan) and Zenro¯ren (National Confederation of Trade Unions, the
second largest); industrial federations in manufacturing sectors such as
electronics (Denki Rengo¯: Japanese Electrical, Electronic and Information
Union, which is a member federation of JC-Metal (previously IMF-JC), for
example) and in non-competitive service sectors such as retail, textile and
ﬁnance/insurance (UA Zensen, the largest industrial federation in Japan,
for example); enterprise unions; and community unions such as Zenkoku
Union (Japan Community Union Federation). Most interviews were semi-
structured and lasted for an hour or so, and questions were asked about
interviewees’ opinions on worker organizing, deregulation of both regular and
non-regular employment and their perceptions of the working conditions of
regular workers.
The structure of this article is as follows. Section 2 critically examines the
perspective of labour market dualism. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the reform
of regular employment in Japan and its political process from a perspective of
unions’ power resources and preferences. Section 5 summarizes the ﬁndings of
the article and considers the implications of the diversiﬁcation of the labour
market for worker protection.
2. Dualism and power resources perspectives on labour market deregulation
Scholars with a dualism perspective claim that, in non-liberal market
economies, liberalization of the labour market has been limited to non-
regular employment and regular employment has been hardly deregulated
(Emmenegger 2015; Emmenegger et al. 2012: 9–17; Hassel 2014; Palier and
Thelen 2010; Rueda 2007; Thelen 2009, 2014; Thelen and Kume 1999: 496–7,
2006: 35). According to Emmenegger et al., ‘dualization is a process that is
characterized by the differential treatment of insiders and outsiders and that
can take the form of newly created institutional dualisms or the deepening
of existing institutional dualisms’ (2012: 10). Based on an insider–outsider
theory, Rueda (2007) claims strong regulation of regular employment protects
insiders to the detriment of outsiders. In this article, dualization is understood
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as a process of the increasing segmentation of labourmarkets between the core
of regular employment in the primary labour market, where regular workers
(in large companies) are supposed to beneﬁt from better working conditions
and employment protection as ‘insiders’, and the expanding periphery of
non-regular employment in the secondary labour market, where non-regular
workers (and regular workers in SMEs) engage in inferior jobs with low
protection as ‘outsiders’. Although scholars with a dualism perspective
recognize that the core of regular employment has been shrinking, they
claim that regular employment has hardly been deregulated, as unions’ core
members are regular workers and unions make utmost efforts to protect
their employment (Emmenegger 2015; Emmenegger et al. 2012: 9–17; Thelen
and Kume 1999: 496–7). The maintenance of cooperative industrial relations
between employers and core regular workers, that is, ‘cross-class’ alliance, is
essential to ensure business productivity and competitiveness, so deregulation
of regular employment is limited and job protection is maintained (Hassel
2014: 63; Thelen and Kume 1999: 496–7; 2006: 35).
Thelen (2014) categorizes ‘dualization’ as a type of liberalization along
with two other different types of liberalization: ‘deregulation’ and ‘embedded
ﬂexibilization’ (pp. 13–15). In contrast to deregulation as wholesale
liberalization as seen in the United States and Britain, liberalization in non-
liberal economies is either dualization (liberalization occurs only in non-
regular employment while regular employment remains regulated), as seen
in the continental Europe, or embedded ﬂexibilization (despite liberalization,
solidarity is maintained), as seen in Scandinavia. As for labour market policy,
Thelen identiﬁes dualization in continental European non-liberal economies
by examining active labour market policies (ALMPs) and short-time work
(STW) policies. However, ALMPs and STW policies are not major indicators
of labour market ﬂexibility and Thelen does not assess the measures to
deregulate employment protection and working-time rules in the case of
regular employment and the scope of deregulation in the case of non-regular
employment. These measures are more commonly used as indicators to
measure the ﬂexibility of regular and non-regular employment and are also
used by the OECD.
In addition to the problem with Thelen’s indicators to measure labour
market ﬂexibility, several scholars questioned the dualism perspective. For
example, Holst (2014) claims that the core-periphery boundaries between
regular and non-regular employment blurred recently in the two key industries
of the German economy (telecommunications and metalworking). As a result
of outsourcing of call centres in telecommunications and use of temporary
agency work in metalworking, regular workers ﬁnd themselves in intensiﬁed
competition with non-regular workers and their working conditions have
deteriorated. Through this neoliberal process, labour relations have become
more dependent on market mechanisms and German labour markets are
experiencing ‘fragmentation’ after previous dualization. Miura (2012) also
argues that the insider–outsider theory is inadequate for explaining the
degradation of regular workers’ working conditions in Japan by referring
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to the increased functional and wage ﬂexibilities in the internal labour
market (pp. 83–8). At the same time, unions do not necessarily pursue a
dualization strategy to protect the interests of core regular workers. For
example,Kornelakis (2016) shows the Italian case of ‘tempered’ labourmarket
dualization and outsider ‘inclusion’ as unions’ strategies based on the ideology
of class solidarity. Crouch (2015) also points out unions’ efforts to avoid
the growth of non-regular workers as outsiders, as unions see it as a threat
to their role in collective bargaining institutions, based on seven European
country case studies of the hospital industry in the protected public sector
and the metal industry (automotive and electronics) in the private sector
exposed to international competition. In contrast to the dualization theory
that regards insider–outsider divide as a result of a unions’ (second-best)
strategy (Emmenegger 2015: 96), Crouch emphasizes employers’ business
strategies as a factor that creates outsiders.
When we examine recent changes in European labour market policies,
we notice a number of non-liberal market economies relaxed the degree of
employment protection by facilitating dismissal of regular workers, contrary
to the theoretical expectation of a dualism perspective. For example, Denmark
is well known for its ‘ﬂexicurity’ measures of relatively low employment
protection and a high degree of unemployment protection through generous
unemployment insurance (Appelbaum 2012: 316; Gooderham et al. 2015:
167–71; Madsen 2004: 189). Non-liberal market economies in Southern
Europe such as Spain and Italy also relaxed dismissal rules (Moreira et al.
2015: 206–8). The centre-right government of the Partido Popular in Spain,
where the highest rate of ﬁxed-term contracts was recorded among European
countries, relaxed the dismissal regulation related to regular workers in return
for a limitation on the use of ﬁxed-term contracts in the 1997 tripartite
political pact (Molina Romo 2005: 18; Talani and Cervin˜o 2003: 220; Toharia
andMalo 2000: 314–15). After the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, the Socialist
government permitted dismissal of regular workers for economic reasons
(Contrato de fomento del empleo, Law 35/2010), contrary to the claim made
by Rueda (2007) that the Socialist government would protect the interests
of regular workers as the core supporters of the party. In addition, the
Partido Popular government further relaxed dismissal regulation with Decree
Law 3/2012. In Italy, while both centre-left and centre-right governments
increased labour market ﬂexibility by deregulating non-regular employment
since the 1990s, the Monti-Fornero Reform of 2012 introduced a measure
to allow dismissal of regular workers with ﬁduciary compensation instead of
reinstitution of relevant workers in the case of unfair dismissal. In addition,
the Jobs Act of 2014 relaxed the conditions of dismissal further. The use
of ﬁxed-term contracts also became more restricted by the Monti-Fornero
Reform to rectify poor working conditions experienced by a large number
of young workers (Tiraboschi 2012: 54–5, 81–3). In the Spanish and Italian
cases, it may be argued that the governments introduced policies aimed
at ‘narrowing’ insider–outsider gaps, or ‘reducing’ labour market dualism.
Although it is not about dismissal regulation, some scholars claim that
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Germany, a quintessential non-liberal market economy, introduced a more
liberalized pension regime that reduced its dualistic nature (Bridgen and
Meyer 2014; Naczyk and Seeleib-Keiser 2015: 362, 367). It is also claimed
that the degree of dualism in German unemployment protection and ALMP
was reduced as a result of the Hartz IV legislation (Clasen and Georne 2011).
In contrast to scholars with a dualism perspective, scholars with a power
resources perspective (Esping-Andersen 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001;
Korpi 1983, 2006) emphasize political conﬂict and the relevance of ‘class’
in determining the characteristics of social and labour market policies.
According to these scholars, the power resources of working-class vis-a`-vis
employers are inﬂuenced by the level of union density, the type of unions
(craft, industrial, enterprise and so on), the number of national confederations
(concentrated or fragmented), the relationship between social democratic
parties and labour unions and so on (Korpi 1983: 39). While scholars with a
dualism perspective claim that employers and core regular employees in non-
liberal market economies have maintained cooperative industrial relations by
forming a cross-class coalition to maintain business competitiveness and job
protection (Hassel 2014: 63; Thelen and Kume 1999: 496–7; 2006: 35) and
it may be true to some extent, especially in manufacturing sectors, scholars
with a power resources perspective claim that unions’ political conﬂicts with
employers are crucial in determining the degree of labour market ﬂexibility
and worker protection (Korpi 2006). In this case, what matters is the power
resources of labour unions to mobilize workers and maintain class solidarity.
Unions’ dualization strategies in cooperation with employers may
eventually reduce their power resources as a result of an increasing number
of unorganized non-regular workers and the reduced human and ﬁnancial
resources available to unions. In Japan, unions have to continue organizing
workers to maintain their power resources in the context of declining union
density and an increasing number of non-regular workers. For example, the
Labour Standards Law stipulates that unions should represent a majority
of workers in a workplace in order to exercise rights to engage in collective
bargaining with employers to negotiate the maximum amount of overtime
work (Article 36) and the introduction of ‘discretionary work’ (sairyo¯ ro¯do¯,
to be explained later) among professional workers (Article 38-3). Given the
remaining importance of unions as a political actor in industrial relations,
this article examines the changing power relations between labour and
capitalist classes from a power resources perspective to demonstrate that the
political conﬂict between these classes has played a major role in deciding
the characteristics of labour market policy, including deregulation of regular
employment. However, the article also pays attention to a coalitional politics
perspective emphasized by scholars of dualism and considers the different
preferences of unions to explain the characteristics of labour market policy,
without assuming that unions share common interests in maintaining class
solidarity (Gordon 2015: 81).
The following sections analyse reform of regular employment from the
1990s until the current LDP administration of Prime Minister Abe by
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examining the deregulation of working-time rules, several proposals to relax
dismissal rules and the diversiﬁcation of regular employment. These sections
are aimed at demonstrating that, instead of maintaining dual labour markets,
the LDP government has deregulated or proposed to deregulate not only non-
regular employment but also regular employment in response to demands
from employers. Labour unions have not been able to prevent the government
from attempting to deregulate regular employment, however, as a result of
their declining power resources.
3. Proposals for more flexible regular employment and labour
market diversification
Japanese employers represented by Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of
Employers’ Associations, later Nihon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation)
since 2002) issued a policy document titled ‘Japanese management in a
new era’ and demanded labour market deregulation to increase business
competitiveness by promoting ﬂexibility in production and human resource
management (Nikkeiren 1995). In addition to the pressure from shareholders
to achieve short-term proﬁts as a result of the ‘ﬁnancialization’ of capitalism
(Isogai 2012: 43, 46; Yamada and Hirano 2012: 15), the global and regional
integration of production and the intensiﬁed economic competition from
neighbouring Asian countries based on low-cost production required
Japanese companies to increase functional ﬂexibility and decrease production
costs (Watanabe 2014, 2015a). In this economic context, labour market
deregulation was considered appropriate, as well as the relocation of
manufacturing plants overseas and the internationalization of supply chains
(Nikkeiren 1995).
It is true that labour market deregulation was mostly aimed at non-regular
employment (although regular employment has also been deregulated in
terms of working-time regulation). For example, the 1999 amendment to
the Temporary Work Agency Law liberalized temporary agency work except
for a small number of occupations and the 2003 amendment expanded the
scope of temporary agency work by allowing it to be used in manufacturing
sectors (Watanabe 2012, 2014, 2015a). After the centre-left government of the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) increased the protection of temp workers
in 2012, the current (second) Abe administration of the LDP implemented
further deregulation of temporary agency work in 2015 by enabling employers
to use it without any time limit as long as they change agency workers
every three years in the same job position (Asahi Shimbun 2015b). The
LDP government also deregulated ﬁxed-term contracts through the 1998
and 2003 amendments to the Labour Standards Law, although the centre-
left DPJ government increased the protection of ﬁxed-term workers by
amending the Labour Contract Law in 2012 (see Table 1 for deregulatory
reforms in regular and non-regular employment passed since the 1990s).
As for part-time work, there has been no restriction on its use in Japan,
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TABLE 1
List of Major Deregulatory Measures Passed by the Japanese Government from the 1990s
Temporary Work Agency Law
1999 amendment
– liberalized temporary agency work except for a small number of occupations.
– set one year as the maximum period of temporary agency work, except for the original 26
occupations requiring professional and technical skills, for which three years was
permitted.
2003 amendment
– permitted temporary agency work in the manufacturing sector.
– extended the maximum period of temporary agency work from one to three years, except
for the original 26 occupations requiring professional and technical skills for which an
open-ended contract was permitted.
2015 amendment
– allowed employers to use temporary agency work permanently for the same position or
job as long as they change workers every three years.
Labour Standards Law
Discretionary work
1998 amendment
– introduced the planning-type (kikaku gyo¯mugata) discretionary work among white-collar
regular workers (another type of the discretionary work for professional workers (senmon
gyo¯mugata) was introduced in the 1987 amendment to the Labour Standards Law).
2003 amendment
– expanded the scope of the planning-type discretionary work.
Fixed-term contract
1998 amendment
– extended the maximum period of ﬁxed-term contract from one to three years for newly
employed highly-skilled workers and elderly workers aged 60 and over.
2003 amendment
– extended the maximum period of ﬁxed-term contract from one to three years (from three
to ﬁve years for highly-skilled workers and elderly workers aged 60 and over).
unlike in some continental European countries, so no deregulation was
necessary.
Deregulation of non-regular employment has deteriorated the working
conditions of regular workers, however, by making it easier for employers to
use non-regular workers instead of regular workers in not only service sectors
but also manufacturing sectors (Interviews, Zenkoku Union, April 2013;
Zenro¯ren, April 2014; see also Imai 2011: 163). An increasing number of non-
regular workers who engage in jobs previously performed by regular workers
has threatened jobs of regular workers by enabling employers to suggest they
may be replaced with cheap non-regular workers in the case of their reluctance
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FIGURE 1
The Number of Young Regular and Non-Regular Workers Aged 15–24.
[Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE 2
Number of ‘karo¯ jisatsu’ (Suicide Due to Overwork).
[Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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to work in poorer conditions (Interviews, Rengo¯ Non-Regular Work Centre,
April 2014; Shutoken Seinen Union, April 2013; see also Vlandas 2013 for
the French case of a high possibility of replacement of regular workers with
temporary workers). In fact, the number of regular workers aged 15–24 has
decreased since the 1990s, especially as a result of both reducing the hiring
of university graduates as regular workers and increasing their hiring as non-
regular workers at the time of economic stagnation (Goka 1999: 83; Goto¯
2011: 9–12; see also Figure 1).1 As a result, the working conditions of regular
workers have deteriorated, as seen in their work overload (a cause for karo¯
jisatsu, committing suicide due to overwork) and stagnant wages since the
mid-1990s (with little increase in the gap between regular and non-regular
workers’ wages), contrary to a dualism perspective that assumes protected
work conditions of regular workers (see Figures 2–4). Despite the official
stance of opposition by Rengo¯ and some industrial federations to greater
use of (unorganized) non-regular workers, enterprise unions in competitive
sectors have not opposed it and allowed union density to decline further,
as they consider non-regular workers as a necessary buffer for coping with
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FIGURE 3
Monthly Wages of Regular Workers.
[Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE 4
Monthly Wages of Regular and Non-Regular Workers in Recent Years.
[Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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economic ﬂuctuations and maintaining business competitiveness (Mouer and
Kawanishi 2005: 127). In this situation, national centres such as Rengo¯ and
industrial federations in service sectors, where there are a large number of non-
regular workers, began to organize them and attempt to reduce an insider–
outsider gap. However, the progress has been slow (Interviews, Rengo¯ Non-
Regular Work Centre, April 2014; UA Zensen, April 2014).
In addition to non-regular employment, however, the LDP government has
implemented deregulation of regular employment by deregulating working-
time rules. The current Abe administration since December 2012 has aimed
to enable employers to use regular workers more ﬂexibly and proposed
several deregulatory measures. They include, among other things, (i) further
deregulation of working-time rules, (ii) relaxation of dismissal rules by
allowing ﬁduciary compensation in the case of unfair dismissal and (iii)
diversiﬁcation of regular employment by promoting the use of ‘semi-regular’
work and reducing the scope of regular workers under lifetime employment.
Most recently, the Abe administration proposed ‘equal work, equal pay’ to
increase the disposal income of non-regular workers and promote economic
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growth with their greater spending power. This policy proposal was aimed at
reducing the insider–outsider gap and labour market dualism, in contrast to
a dualism perspective (Asahi Shimbun 2016; Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2016).2
As for working-time deregulation, ‘discretionary work’, which enabled
employers to increase working-time ﬂexibility of regular employment by
linking regular workers’ salaries with work performance instead of actual
hours worked, was introduced with the 1987 amendment to the Labour
Standards Law. Although discretionary work enabled employers to reduce
labour cost by not paying overtime except for late night work and work
on weekends and holidays, it was initially applied only to professional
workers with job discretion. However, employers represented by Nikkeiren
demanded the expansion of the scope of discretionary work, and the 1998
and 2003 amendments to the Labour Standards Law expanded the scope
by including the ‘planning-type’ (kikaku gyo¯mugata) white-collar workers
engaged in business planning and analysis (Nikkeiren 1994).3 The 1998
amendment allowed employers to use discretionarywork among the planning-
type white-collar workers assumed to have job discretion in the headquarters
and core divisions of companies.4 The 2003 amendment expanded the scope
of discretionary work further by including the planning-type white-collar
workers whether or not they worked in headquarters or core divisions. As
a result, the number of companies that used discretionary work increased,
including those in manufacturing sectors. The greater use of discretionary
work exacerbated the working conditions of regular workers as a result of long
working hours without overtime pay and greater use of performance-based
job evaluation (Asahi Shimbun 2014b; Imai 2011: 104–11, 119–21; Isogai
2012: 45, 55).
After the scope of discretionary work was expanded in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, the ﬁrst Abe administration (2006–2007) attempted to introduce
the ‘white-collar exemption’, which is complete exemption of white-collar
regular workers from working-time regulation without any overtime pay (it
has been already used in the United States). It is different from discretionary
work, for which employers have to pay for overtime work during late night
time, weekends and holidays. Although the ﬁrst Abe administration had to
give up introducing the white-collar exemption to avoid voter backlash in the
House of Councillors election in July 2007, the second Abe administration
sinceDecember 2012 has proposed to introduce it again by renaming it ‘highly
professional work’ (Asahi Shimbun 2014a). During the policy discussion in
the Industrial Competitiveness Council (Sangyo¯ Kyo¯so¯ryoku Kaigi), a new
cabinet committee established by the second Abe administration, a member
of the Council Sakakibara Sadayuki, Chairman of Keidanren since June
2014, emphasized the necessity for promoting working-time ﬂexibility and
introducing the highly professional work. Although the bill was strongly
criticized as ‘no overtime pay’ bill (zangyo¯dai zero ho¯an) by opposition parties
such as the DPJ and labour unions led by Rengo¯, the bill is likely to pass
eventually, as the LDP coalition government has a majority in both Houses of
the Diet (Japanese Parliament) (Mizoue 2015: 14–16; Nihon Keizai Shimbun
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2015c). Although the eligibility criteria for the highly professional work is
set rather high and only those workers whose annual income is about 10
million yen (about US$ 90,000 at the exchange rate of US$1 = 110 yen) are
targeted, unions are afraid that, once introduced, its eligibility criteria may be
lowered through several revisions to the Labour Standards Law, as in the case
of the expanded scope of temporary agency work through several revisions
to the Temporary Agency Work Law (Mizoue 2015: 21–5). The second Abe
administration also proposed expanding the use of discretionary work among
regular workers whose annual income is less than about 10 million yen (Nihon
Keizai Shimbun 2013, 2015a).
Although the dismissal of regular workers in large companies remains
officially difficult, the LDP government has discussed the policy idea of
relaxing dismissal regulation from time to time in response to demands from
employers, who have regarded an inﬂexible labour market as one of what
they call ‘six burdens’ on the Japanese economy (Nihon Keizai Shimbun
2015b).5 The current Abe administration has aimed to change Japanese
employment based on lifetime employment and achieve economic growth by
relaxing dismissal rules and promoting labour mobility from declining to new
industries. For this purpose, the Industrial Competitiveness Council proposed
the introduction of ﬁduciary compensation, which would exempt employers
from their obligation to reinstate workers to previous work positions in
the case of unfair dismissal, ﬁrst in the newly established ‘strategic special
economic zones’ (senyaku tokku) and then nationwide (Asahi Shimbun 2015a;
Industrial Competitiveness Council 2013a, b; Nishitani 2014: 18–21). The
membership of the Industrial Competitiveness Council has been dominated
by business leaders (such as Sakakibara Sadayuki mentioned above, Mikitani
Hiroshi, Chairman of a newly formed employer association ‘Shinkeizai
Renmei’ (Japan Association of New Economy) and Hasegawa Yasuchika,
who was then Chairman of Keizai Do¯yu¯kai (Japan Association of Corporate
Executives) and academics (such as TakenakaHeizo, who served as aMinister
in charge of Economic and Fiscal Policy during the Koizumi administration)
who are eager to deregulate the Japanese economy and labour market.
The current Abe administration has also aimed to diversify regular
employment by increasing the number of ‘semi-regular’ workers (gentei
seishain), whose job locations and responsibilities are limited in contrast
to core regular workers under lifetime employment. Semi-regular workers
are regular workers only in status, and their wages are lower than those of
core regular workers although they are higher than those of non-regular
workers. Employment protection of semi-regular workers is not as secure
as that of core regular workers either (Morioka 2015: 141–4). In this
sense, the increased use of semi-regular work may be considered as the
diversiﬁcation of regular employment and the labour market, not dualization.
Although some companies have already been using semi-regular workers to
improve work-life balance and increase the employment of female workers,
the second Abe administration has attempted to promote the use of semi-
regular workers as part of its economic growth strategy through more ﬂexible
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regular employment (Interview, Denki Rengo¯, April 2014; see also Industrial
Competitiveness Council 2013c for PrimeMinister Abe’s intention to promote
semi-regular work and eliminate the dual labour market). Critics of this
measure argue, however, that the greater use of semi-regularworkers is nothing
more than a way to continue using female regular workers more cheaply and
achieve easier dismissal, as jobs of semi-regular workers are not protected
as much as those of regular workers under lifetime employment (Interview,
Shutoken Seinen Union, April 2014; see also Asahi Shimbun 2013).
As a result of certain deregulation and more ﬂexible use of regular
employment, the Japanese labour market has diversiﬁed, if not deregulated as
extensively as liberal market economies such as the United States, contrary
to the dualism perspective that the labour market consists of protected
regular employment and ﬂexible non-regular employment. We can now
identify greater diversity of workers consisting of a shrinking number of
‘core’ regular workers, who are protected under lifetime employment but
increasingly suffer from deteriorated working conditions; ‘professional’ or
‘specialist’ regular workers, who are supposed to have job discretion and
work under deregulated working-time rules without receiving overtime pay
in most situations; ‘peripheral’ regular workers, who have become more
vulnerable to employers’ neoliberal offensives on job protection and do not
beneﬁt from seniority-based pay despite their status as regular workers; ‘semi’-
regular workers mentioned above; and non-regular workers, whose working
conditions remain precarious. Although dualism between regular and non-
regular employment still exists, the Japanese labour market has become more
diverse rather than remain dualistic. Not only the scope of regular workers
under lifetime employment has been shrinking but also an increasing number
of regular workers have suffered from poorer working conditions in a more
ﬂexible standard labour market.
4. Power resources of unions to resist deregulatory proposals
This section analyses why labour unions allowed the second Abe
administration to propose deregulation of regular employment by examining
their power resources and preferences (see Gordon 2015 for a similar
analytical perspective in the case of unemployment protection and ALMP
among OECD countries). This article assesses the power resources of unions
in terms of (i) access to government policy-making, (ii) union density and
capacity to mobilize workers and (iii) unions’ preferences for and conﬂicts
of interest in labour market ﬂexibility, to examine how the reduced power
resources of unions have undermined their capacity to resist the government
proposal to promote ﬂexibility of regular employment, contrary to the
theoretical expectation of scholars with a dualism perspective.
Labour policy-making in Japan wasmostly based on the policy deliberation
in the advisory councils (shingikai) in the Ministry of Labour, and unions as
well as employers had regular representatives. However, the LDP government
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established the Deregulation Committee in the mid-1990s mostly to represent
business interests (Miura 2012: 123–30; Watanabe 2012, 2014). The cabinet
adopted policy proposals made by the Deregulation Committee and this new
top–down policy-making process undermined the policy-making function
of the advisory councils to some extent and weakened the political power
of unions. In addition to the complete loss of access to policy-making in
the Deregulation Committee soon after the inauguration of the neoliberal
Koizumi administration in 2001, unions lost their veto power in the advisory
councils when the Cabinet Order on the Labour Policy Council was issued
at the time of ministerial reorganization in the same year (Watanabe 2012,
2014). Labour representatives in the advisory councils possessed the power
to abolish bills consulted on by the Labour Minister by not sending any
representative to advisory meetings. However, the Cabinet Order made it
possible for employers’ and public representatives to convene meetings and
propose bills irrespective of labour opposition.
The centre-left DPJ government from 2009 until 2012 changed labour
policy-making process to some extent. It restored tripartite policy-making
among labour, employers’ and public representatives in the advisory councils
at the centre of the policy-making process by suspending cabinet committees
established by the LDP such as the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy
and the Deregulation Committee. However, due to the control of the less
powerful House of Councillors by the opposition coalition led by the LDP,
the DPJ government was not able to introduce all the worker protective
measures requested by Rengo¯ (Interview, Rengo¯, April 2013). The current
Abe administration of the LDP, which came back to power in December
2012, resumed cabinet committees. In addition, the administration established
new cabinet committees such as the Industrial Competitiveness Council to
promote economic growth. These cabinet committees proposed a number of
measures aimed at deregulating not only non-regular employment but also
regular employment, such as the relaxation of dismissal rules as mentioned
above, by excluding unions from policy-making (Deregulation Committee
2013a,b; Industrial Competitiveness Council 2013a,b; Igarashi 2014: 51–63).
In addition to unions’ reduced access to government policy-making,
declining union density has weakened their power by reducing their human
and ﬁnancial resources. Union density in Japan has been declining, especially
since the government’s implementation of labour market deregulation in the
1990s (see Figure 5). Against this background, Rengo¯ and some industrial
federation made efforts to organize regular workers in SMEs and non-regular
workers.
We have increased our efforts to organize not only regular workers in our group
companies but also non-regular workers, as their number has been increasing in our
industry and we need to organize them in order to continue representing a majority
of workers in each group company (Interview, Seiho Ro¯ren (National Federation of
Life Insurance Workers’ Unions), April 2014).
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FIGURE 5
Union Density in Japan.
[Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Source: Basic Survey on Labour Unions, 2016, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
We aim to organize non-regular workers to improve their working conditions and
reduce the gap between regular workers and non-regular workers. However, it would
also contribute to greater human and ﬁnancial resources of our group unions and
revitalize the labour movement in Japan (Interview, Rengo¯ Non-Regular Work
Centre, April 2014).
However, worker organizing has not progressed as intended by Rengo¯
and declining union density has negatively affected unions’ capacity to
organize and mobilize workers. In addition, Rengo¯’s human and ﬁnancial
resources remain small compared to those of enterprise unions (Interview,
Rengo¯, April 2014; see also Suzuki 2006: 293), and industrial federations
in competitive sectors such as JC-Metal and enterprise unions in general
have been uninterested and made little progress in organizing non-regular
workers (Interviews,DenkiRengo¯, April 2014;Headquarters ofHitachi group
enterprise unions, April 2014; see also Suzuki 2012: 75). These unions have
been more interested in maintaining cooperative industrial relations with
employers in order not to lose productivity and competitiveness than ﬁghting
against employers by resorting to class solidarity and conducting strikes
(Suzuki 2012: 79, 86; Watanabe 2014, 2015b; see Figure 6 for the decreased
number of strikes since 1990).
It is true that region-based community unions (also called social movement
unions) have increasingly empowered hitherto unorganized regular workers
in SMEs and precarious non-regular workers by organizing and assisting
them in bargaining with employers. Some community unions have also
engaged actively in political actions such as holding meetings with DPJ
and Communist Party politicians in the Diet and making policy requests to
bureaucracy such as the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Interviews,
Shutoken Seinen Union, April 2014; Zenkoku Union, April 2013; Zento¯itsu
Workers’ Union/ Iju¯ren (Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan), March
2016). However, community unions have struggled to retain union members
and their human and ﬁnancial resources remain too small to revitalize the
labour movement.
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FIGURE 6
Number of Strikes for More than a Half Day.
[Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
283
208
117
50 38
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
N
um
be
r
Source: Labour Dispute Survey, 2016, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
Our membership has not increased because of low retention rates. Many members
quit once their individual disputes are solved, as they cannot continue paying union
fees because of their poor and precarious working situations (Interview, Shutoken
Seinen Union, March 2016).
We have suffered from very small ﬁnancial resources and now we can afford to hire
only one full-time staffmember.We depend on volunteers but they are also very busy
in their own work or labour dispute. As a result, we can hardly engage in member
organizing (Interview, Women’s Union Tokyo, September 2013).
Japanese unions have also suffered from conﬂicts of interest caused by their
different preferences for labourmarket ﬂexibility, despite achieving a high level
of organizational unity after the establishment of the largest national union
confederation Rengo¯ in 1989. Conﬂicts of interest weakened the political
power of unions and made it more difficult for them to resist the government
proposals to deregulate regular employment. Enterprise unions, especially
those in manufacturing sectors, have mostly represented the interests of
regular workers in large companies rather than promoting general class
interests and often formed a cross-class alliance rather than maintaining
class solidarity in the case of deregulation of non-regular employment and
promotion of discretionary work.
Most enterprise unions are not interested in organizing non-regular workers.
Instead, we seek material beneﬁts for union members. What is the most important
thing for us is the survival of companies and the employment protection of union
members (Interview, Headquarters of Hitachi group enterprise unions, April 2014).
During the negotiation process of an amendment to the Labour Standards
Law in the late 1990s, for example, enterprise unions in the internationally
competitive sectors such as automobile and electronics formed a cross-class
alliance with Nikkeiren to support an expansion of the scope of discretionary
work as a measure to deregulate working-time rules despite opposition by
other unions. The behaviour of these unions reﬂected their concern with the
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maintenance of business productivity and competitiveness (Kume 2005: 173–
5, 180–2; Watanabe 2012, 2014). Enterprise unions control a large amount of
ﬁnancial resources in comparison to Rengo¯, as enterprise unions collect union
fees directly from their members and only a small percentage of these fees
are allocated to industrial federations ﬁrst and then Rengo¯ (Interview, Rengo¯,
April 2014; see also Suzuki 2006: 293). Human resources of Rengo¯ are also
relatively small in comparison to those of industrial federations and enterprise
unions (Nakamura and Miura 2005: 193). As a result, Rengo¯ was not able to
unify the positions of its affiliated enterprise unions and industrial federations
and allowed the LDP government to expand the scope of discretionary work.
As a result of reduced access to policy-making, declining union density
and insufficient capacity to organize and mobilize workers, and the different
preferences for and conﬂicts of interest in labour market ﬂexibility, unions
experienced decline in their power resources and the power relations between
unions and employers shifted in favour of the latter. Despite the existence
of different economic interests, Japanese employers, mostly represented by
Nikkeiren and later Nihon Keidanren, have coordinated those interests and
placed consistent demands for labour market deregulation, as seen in the
minutes of cabinet committees such as the Deregulation Committee and
the Industrial Competitiveness Council (Deregulation Committee 2013a,b;
Industrial Competitiveness Council 2013a,b,c). The economic interests of
employers have been well represented by the cabinet committees and they
have been able to maintain institutionalized access to policy-making in
contrast to labour unions, which lost such access after the inauguration of
the neoliberal Koizumi administration (Watanabe 2014). Contrary to the
theoretical expectation based on a dualism perspective, Japanese employers
and the LDP government have attempted to promote deregulation of not only
non-regular employment but also regular employment. This is because they
have been eager to enhance competitiveness and promote economic growth
by lowering labour costs and increasing labour market ﬂexibility through a
smaller scope of regular workers under lifetime employment in the context
of economic stagnation and the intensiﬁed competition from neighbouring
Asian countries. Most recently, the current Abe administration of the LDP,
which has a two-thirds majority in both Houses of the Diet, has been
eager to achieve economic growth with its Abenomics by enhancing labour
productivity through deregulation. In this economic and political context,
further amendments to the Labour Standards Law aimed at deregulating
regular employment to a greater extent are likely during the current LDP
administration.
5. Conclusion
This article has analysed deregulation of regular employment and the
diversiﬁcation of the labour market in Japan from a perspective of unions’
power resources and preferences. The article has claimed that the LDP
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government deregulated, or proposed to deregulate, not only non-regular
employment but also regular employment to overcome economic stagnation
and increase the competitiveness of the Japanese economy. In addition
to deregulating working-time rules by expanding discretionary work and
proposing to introduce the white-collar exemption, the LDP government has
attempted to relax dismissal rules in response to demands from employers and
diversify regular employment by promoting the use of semi-regular work. For
this purpose, labour policy-making has been modiﬁed in a way to represent
employers’ interests to a greater extent by excluding labour unions from
the policy-making process in cabinet committees such as the Deregulation
Committee and the Industrial Competitiveness Council. Labour unions have
not been able to resist management offensive and the government’s proposals
to increase the ﬂexibility of regular employment as a result of their insufficient
power resources to mobilize workers, which was caused by their conﬂicts
of interest in labour market ﬂexibility and reduced access to government
policy-making.
Although the dualism perspective is useful for explaining the existing divide
between supposedly stable regular employment and deregulated and ﬂexible
non-regular employment, it is not well suited to detecting changes in regular
employment. The dualism perspective has also difficulty in explaining the
recent trend of unions’ and governments’ efforts to narrow a gap between
regular workers (in large companies) as insiders and non-regular workers (as
well as regular workers in SMEs) as outsiders in some non-liberal market
economies. The Japanese case shows that the government has deregulated
or proposed to deregulate not only non-regular employment but also regular
employment in a way to make regular employment more ﬂexible and weaken
the employment protection of regular workers. The recent changes in non-
liberal market economies, including Japan, imply that we may be witnessing
the process of ‘de-dualization’ (throughmore ﬂexible regular employment and
more protected non-regular employment), following extensive labour market
dualism. In addition, the expansion of non-regular employment in Japan as
a result of labour market deregulation has affected the working conditions of
regular workers in negative ways, as employers have been able to urge regular
workers to work in deteriorated working conditions by hinting that they could
be replaced by increasingly available non-regular workers. Japanese employers
have less commitment to the norms of lifetime employment than before, as
seen in the decreased use of core regular workers even in the manufacturing
sector. Precisely because of the threat coming from employers’ increased use of
non-regular workers and greater possibility of replacement (only if perceived
so), regular workers have greater incentives to stick to regular employment,
which explains little decline in the tenure/turnover of regular workers and
their willingness to work in poorer conditions. However, the number of these
regular workers has been decreasing.
In contrast to non-liberal market economies in continental Europe, where
non-regular workers are less susceptible to unequal treatment as a result
of the greater power resources of unions (and EC Directives stipulating
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equal treatment between regular and non-regular workers), the expansion of
low-paid non-regular employment with poor working conditions has made
Japanese regular workers more vulnerable to downward pressures on their
working conditions and employment protection. The Japanese case study in
this article suggests that, without sufficient power resources of labour unions
and class solidarity, the working conditions and employment protection of not
only non-regular workers but also regular workersmay deteriorate, in contrast
to the views of scholars with a dualism perspective.
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Notes
1. In addition, many employers suspended recruiting female regular workers in the
‘assistant’ track (ippan shoku) and hired female university graduates as non-regular
workers (Goka 1999: 119). In the worst cases, some employers dismissed female
regular workers in the assistant track and then rehired them as non-regular workers
in almost illegal manners (Nakano 2006: 29–30; Weathers 2001: 176).
2. In addition, the administration proposed to introduce the limit on overtime work
hours by amending Article 36 of the Labour Standards Law. This proposal,
however, is mostly aimed at improving labour productivity of regular workers (in
addition to enabling regular workers to strike a better work-life balance so that the
fertility rate would improve) rather than improving their working conditions per se.
3. ‘Planning-type’ discretionary work applies to autonomous workwith job discretion
related to business planning and decision making, research and analysis of business
management and so on (Labour Standards Law, Article 38-4).
4. However, unions succeeded in including in the 1998 amendment some clauses that
made the use of discretionary work more difficult (such as the requirement of
unanimous agreement by a labour-management committee) as a result of the loss
of the LDP government in the 1998 Upper House election.
5. ‘Six burdens’ include inﬂexible labour market, highly appreciated yen, high
corporate tax, slow progress in forming economic partnerships with foreign
countries, strict environmental regulation and insufficient electricity provision and
its high price.
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